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Congressional Creativity: The Post-Chadha




For over fifty years, Congress had the luxury of using the legislative
veto to check the power it had delegated to administrative agencies or the
executive branch.' Congress could delegate lawmaking power while
maintaining active control over policymaking decisions.2 Permissible
use of the legislative veto officially ended when the United States
Supreme Court handed down Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.3 "The legislative veto is a statutory provision permitting one or
both Houses of Congress or its committees to annul by resolution an
action or rule of the executive branch or an administrative agency."4
These actions can take many forms including: one-house vetoes, two-
house vetoes, committee vetoes, and committee chair's veto.5
In a striking dissent, Justice White predicted Congress's ability to
legislate would essentially cease.6 Although hampered without use of the
veto, Congress has adapted by relying on various statutory and
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1. See infra Part II.
2. See generally 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 3:19 at 1 (6th ed.
2005).
3. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
4. 7 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, § 170 at 306 (10th ed. 2005).
5. Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 91 (4th ed. 1998).
6. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress's
choice between legislating with exacting specificity or passing lawmaking ability to the
executive).
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nonstatutory mechanisms to control agency action.7 Regardless of the
veto's effectiveness, a system prevails that is more in-line with the
Framers' idea of constitutional democracy.
8
Despite overcoming the reduction in power resulting from the loss
of the veto, Congress's legislative power has been trimmed by
presidential initiative. 9  Recent controversy has surrounded the
presidential use of signing statements to limit the effect of law.1 °
Congress now stands at a crossroads-allow Presidents to continue to
usurp power through directives disregarding the force of law or take a
proactive approach at maintaining the validity of federal statutes.
In charting the evolution of congressional ability to control agency
action, Part II of this Comment examines the history of the legislative
veto. This section traces the creation of the legislative veto under
President Hoover through its demise under President Carter. Part II
particularly focuses on the Chadha majority's rationale for eliminating
legislative vetoes, as well as the dissent's sharp criticism and apocalyptic
predictions. In addition, it compares the dissent's concerns with other
commentators' immediate responses; this sets up an evaluation of
whether these predictions came true and what formal and informal
responses have been made in light of the Court's decision in Chadha.
Part III conducts the evaluation through a discussion of what impact
Chadha has had on the legislative process and congressional methods to
retain policymaking control and influence. This section analyzes
Congress's response to the Chadha decision and surveys the particular
mechanisms used in a struggle to retain influence over agency
policymaking.
Part IV addresses the effect these formal and informal mechanisms
have had on the democratic process. This portion provides analysis of
whether the legislative veto, albeit unconstitutional, is a preferable
mechanism in our constitutional system, or whether it should remain
banned. In presenting both sides to the argument, Part IV discusses
7. See generally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 275-84 (Autumn 1993); Michael Herz, The Legislative
Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha and the 104th Congress, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 319, 319 (1997).
8. See generally Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Who Needs the Legislative Veto?, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1984); Richard B. Smith & Guy M. Struve, Aftershocks of the
Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258 (1983).
9. See generally T.J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and
Institutional Implications, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 20 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/getfile.php?rid=52082.pdf.
10. See generally American Bar Association (ABA), Report of the Task Force on
Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine (Aug. 2006),




which is the preferable solution in the modem administrative state.
Despite the advantages of the legislative veto, its constitutionality is
clearly suspect. To promote a system closely aligned with our
constitutional and democratic framework, the Comment suggests that the
ban on vetoes remain, but still favors congressional creativity into new
mechanisms that aid in its control of agencies.
Part V looks forward and asks: what will happen when the current
procedures used by Congress to influence agency action do not work? In
Parts II-V, this Comment identifies the different tools at Congress's
disposal and how it has used them to influence agency behavior. Part V
asks: what happens when Congress passes legislation affecting an
agency, but the President includes a signing statement directing the
agency to ignore a portion of the bill he or she has deemed
unconstitutional? The analysis briefly addresses the history and
controversy surrounding presidential signing statements and compares
the application of such statements to legislative vetoes.
II. History of Legislative Vetoes"
The legislative veto was developed12 by the executive branch, not
the legislature.' 3  In response to the expanding government resulting
from the Depression, President Hoover asked Congress for authority to
reorganize the government. 14 He noted that Congress could reserve by
"joint committee" or "with the reservation of power of revision" a check
on the delegation. 15 Congress accepted Hoover's request, 16 giving the
President the ability to make law without prior congressional approval.' 7
Legislative vetoes in governmental reorganization statutes became the
norm18 and were used frequently 19 into the 1980s.
11. For a more exacting look at the history of the legislative veto, see BARBARA
HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988);
Fisher, supra note 7, at 273, 275-84.
12. See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 125, 143 & n.87 (attributing
the first use of term to Millet & Rodgers, The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization
Act of 1939, 1 PUB. AD. REv. 176 (1941)).
13. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); see also Fisher, supra note 7, at 275-76.
14. See Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Executive Departments:
Hearings on "Reorganization of the Executive Departments," 68th Cong. 353 (1924).
15. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
Fisher, supra note 7, at 275-76.
16. Act of June 30, 1932, § 407, 47 Stat. 414 (1932); see also supra note 14.
17. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 91. But see Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the
Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND.
L. REv. 1167, 1181 (1999) (claiming President Woodrow Wilson fathered legislative
veto).
18. FiSHER,supra note 5, at 92-93.
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Legislative vetoes in reorganization statutes paved the way for their
use in other areas of the law.20 During the 1930s and 1940s, their use
was not as prevalent as in later years due to greater trust in agencies.2 '
The 1940s saw the legislative veto applied to national security and
foreign affairs matters. 22 During World War II, Congress included these
provisions over thirty times-giving the executive greater authority to
control national security issues while reserving a check on the
delegation.23 During the 1950s, the number of statutes affected by
legislative vetoes grew,24 but the two decades to follow showed the
sharpest upturn in use.25 During the 1960s and 1970s, public trust of
agencies waned.26  The federal government became more actively
involved in the economy in an effort to pursue social and economic
goals,27 and Congress dramatically increased the use of legislative
vetoes.
28
By the time Chadha was decided in 1983, approximately 210 laws
containing 320 legislative vetoes were on the books.29 Although they
appeared in almost every area of federal regulation, including the space
program, international agreements on nuclear energy, the adjustment of
federal pay rates, 30 environmental protection, product safety, community
19. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for U.S. Senate
on Reargument, App. A) (stating Presidents submitted 115 reorganization plans to
Congress prior to Chadha, of which twenty-three were disapproved).
20. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 92-93.
21. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, IN THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION, 372-73, 376-78, 385-87, 394 (1980) (discussing era known as "Agency
Capture," characteristically described as a period of public mistrust of agencies, more
legislative control, and demand for more accountability of administrative agencies).
22. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White, J., dissenting).
23. H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1089-90 (1975) (listing statutes).
24. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45 (majority opinion) (citing James Abourezk, The
Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on
Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977) (from 1932-1939 five statutes
affected; 1940-1949 nineteen statutes affected; 1950-1959 thirty-four statutes affected;
1960-1969 forty-nine statutes affected; 1970-1975 one hundred sixty-three provisions in
eighty-nine laws)).
25. See id. at 944-45 (citing Abourezk, supra note 24 and accompanying text); see
also JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 4-5 (1996).
26. See WILSON, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. See Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1258.
28. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45 (citing Abourezk, supra note 24 and
accompanying text).
29. See id. at 1003-13 (White, J., dissenting) (appendix to Justice White's dissent
citing fifty-six statutes containing one or more legislative veto provisions); see also Smith
& Struve, supra note 8, at 1258.
30. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 970 & n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
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development, and historic preservation, 31 general application of vetoes
was limited to a small number of areas.
32
A. The Confrontation Builds
During the late 1970s, public fervor over federal control increased,33
and Congress threatened to include legislative vetoes in all statutes
covering agency regulations.34 In response, Attorney General Griffin
Bell issued a statement justifying the time-honored legislative veto in
reorganization statutes but sought to weaken the grounds for similar
provisions in other statutes. 35  The next year, President Carter took a
more antagonistic step by announcing that the administration would treat
enacted legislative vetoes as "report-and-wait ' 36 provisions.37 Although
there would remain "serious consideration by executive officials [the
veto provisions] would not be regarded as legally binding.,
38
Throughout history, many Presidents have complained about
legislative vetoes.39 Yet, Carter became the first President to make
formal notice of his intent to disregard the legal applicability of
legislative vetoes.4 0  Also, his actions leading up to that point41
foreshadowed the ensuing high profile battle.42
31. See Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1258.
32. See id. ("Through summer 1982, of 230 exercises in almost 50 years, 111 were
immigration cases, 65 pertained to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act, 24 concerned government reorganization plans and the remainder of only 30 covered
all other subject matters.").
33. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 284.
34. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
120 (3d ed. 2001).
35. See id. (citing 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 (1977)).
36. Fisher, supra note 7, at 285 ("The administration would report to Congress on
pending actions, wait a specified number of days, take into consideration the
congressional response, and then act in the way the administration decided was best.").
37. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 120 (citing President's Message to
Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1146-49 (June 21, 1978)).
38. Id. (citing 1 PUB. PAPERS 1146-49).
39. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) ("In any event, 11 Presidents,
from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this issue have
gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as unconstitutional.");
Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 789 & n.39 (1984)
(then 1st Cir. Judge) (every modem President has criticized legislative veto's
unconstitutionality, citing Watson, supra note 23, at 1002-29).
40. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 119 (citing 1 PUB. PAPERS 1146-49).
41. See id. at 119-20 (discussing President Carter's disapproval of legislative veto
and his continuous follow-up efforts making sure action was taken to challenge its
constitutionality).
42. See id. at 123 (citing Edward Walsh, Legislative Veto Trend Denounced by
President, WASH. POST, June 22, 1978, at 1 (quoting Senator Frank Church's comments
that the President was "inviting a tug-of-war")).
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Despite Chadha's narrow issue-whether one Jagdish Rai Chadha
would be deported-both sides anticipated a monumental outcome.
4 3
Proponents included a Congress that became accustomed to relying on
this finely crafted tool to keep executive action in check with its
legislative plan.a4 They feared a diminution in power and the loss of a
highly efficient mechanism. 45 On the other hand, opponents included an
administration that saw its chance to eliminate a seemingly
unconstitutional roadblock to its executive agenda.46 Both sides realized
the impact and anxiously awaited the opinion-as did much of
Washington, D.C.47
B. Chadha's "Death Knell"
In the now-famous 48 opinion, the Supreme Court specifically
49
struck down a single-chamber legislative veto of an administrative
adjudicative decision as violative of Article I, Section 750 in INS v.
Chadha51. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision 52 that
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 53  was
unconstitutional, but did not decide the case on separation of powers
43. See id. at 119-26 (discussing heated conflict created by an administration willing
to challenge legislative veto's constitutional validity in court and a Congress relentless to
keep its power).
44. See id. at 118-25. The author cites comments by congresspersons in reaction to
President Carter's message that made clear his intent to eliminate the legislative veto. Id.
Senator Jacob Javits (R, NY) remarked that, "[w]e have attained a reasonable balance
between the power of the President and the power of Congress in many areas. I consider
it a great mistake to unbalance this relationship by such a declaration." Id.; see also
Martin Tolchin, President Asserts He Won't Feel Bound by Congress Vetoes; Sends a
Warning to Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1978, at 1 (The legislators made it clear that
they would fight the President's initiative.).
45. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 98 (discussing the Court's opinion in Chadha which
mentioned that mere desire for convenience and efficiency does not trump constitutional
concerns).
46. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 118-20 (discussing President Carter's June 21, 1978
message highlighting his constitutional concerns and "deep reservations" regarding
further use of the legislative veto).
47. See Biden, supra note 8, at 686 (describing reaction days after decision).
48. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 232 (citing American Political Science Association
Meeting tour of the Supreme Court, August 31, 1984). Chief Justice Burger stated that it
was stretching it to call Chadha one of the top ten most important cases of all-time, but
he did remark that it certainly falls within the top fifty. Id.
49. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (despite Chadha effectively
striking down all legislative vetoes as unconstitutional, the actual holding of the case is
limited).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
51. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
52. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254, § 244(c)(2) (1965).
1130 [Vol. 112:4
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grounds.54 Instead the Court's decision rests on the "[e]xplicit and
unambiguous provisions of the Constitution" 55 that govern the legislative
process-pointing specifically to the bicameralism
56 and presentment 57
clauses. 58 In one succinct paragraph, the Court declared:
Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2) was
not within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing
one House to act alone, and equally clear that it was an exercise of
legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed
in Art. I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the
President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were
intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the
people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain
prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the
separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of
each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been
attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in
conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's
prescription for legislative action: passage by majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President.
59
Specifically, the Court held that § 244(c)(2), the section containing the
legislative veto provisions allowing one House to strike an Attorney
General's order suspending the deportation of an alien, was
unconstitutional .60
Chief Justice Burger's formalistic opinion seemed shocking, not
because of the reasoning or the foundation in law, but because of its
"scope" and "inflexibility., 61 The legislative veto's shaky constitutional
footing was quite obvious 62 and the Court had seemingly ducked the
question numerous times in the past.63 Yet, rather than keeping with the
54. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
55. Id. at 945.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
57. Id. art. I., § 7, cl. 2, 3.
58. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46.
59. Id. at 956-58.
60. Id. at 928.
61. Elliott, supra note 12, at 126-27 (discussing mainstream public opinion
questioning the constitutional validity of legislative vetoes).
62. See id. at 126 & n.8 (commenting that scholars testifying before Congress as to
unconstitutionality of legislative vetoes is a Who's Who of American constitutional law,
including Charles Black, Alexander M. Bickel, Philip B. Kurland, and Laurence Tribe).
63. See id. at 129 & n.25 (citing cases challenging legislative vetoes with Court
declining to reach constitutional issue: Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 n.176 (1976); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl.
1977)); see also Pressler v. Simon, 428 F.Supp. 302 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S.
1028 (1978) (Court summarily affirms constitutionality of Federal Pay Comparability Act
containing legislative veto provision).
2008]
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jurisprudential tradition of tailoring opinions to the narrow issue or issues
at handy and only deciding a constitutional question when absolutely
65necessary, the Court seemed to open the door to strike down all
legislative veto provisions.66 Instead of limiting the decision to a specific
provision of the Act,67 the Court attacked vetoes as a whole. 68 To this
Justice White replied: "[tioday the Court not only invalidates
§ 244(c)(2)... but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative
veto."
69
Dissenting opinions usually do not carry great constitutional
weight.7 ° It is generally understood that the opposing side's waxing may
surface some credible arguments, but the predictions are often
disingenuous or inflated.71 In his stinging criticism of the majority,
however, Justice White's dissent in Chadha seems to accurately forecast
part of the future of the legislative veto, while his other apocalyptic
predictions are less than accurate.72
In the opening line of his dissent, White claimed the Court had not
only struck down the specific section of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, 73 but had also "sound[ed] the death knell for nearly
200 other [legislative vetoes]. 74 White preferred a narrower holding on
separation of powers grounds, thus leaving room for future consideration
of the constitutionality of other congressional review statutes.75
Juxtaposing Burger's formalistic approach, White favored a
pragmatic view. 76 First, he focused on the effect and use of legislative
vetoes and immediately announced, "[t]he prominence of the legislative
veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its importance
to Congress can hardly be overstated.977 White added, "[i]t has become
a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of
64. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952)
(discussing long-held judicial practice of avoiding constitutional issues if possible).
65. See generally Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
66. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
67. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254, § 244(c)(2) (1965).
68. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
70. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 127 (dissenting opinions usually inaccurate source
of insight).
71. See generally id.
72. See generally Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J. dissenting).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2).
74. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Cf Breyer, supra note 39, at 790 (labeling dissent as "functional") with Elliott,
supra note 12, at 128 (describing Justice Whites' dissent as a "utilitarian argument").
77. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
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executive and independent agencies. 78 In an even more dire prediction,
the Justice bemoaned that Congress was left with a "Hobson's choice. 79
It will be forced to either cease delegating power to agencies and start
writing laws with the "requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape," or be forced to
"abdicate its law-making function" to the executive and unelected
administrative agencies.80 Continuing his opening diatribe, White again
points to the legislative veto's use for over fifty years, its place in 200
statutes, and its effect on nearly every field of policymaking.81
Although White devotes a significant portion of his forty-six-page
dissent to the practical need for this "indispensable political invention,"82
he does bring to light one textual ambiguity. If agencies, unelected
administrative bodies, can accept vast amounts of authority to make
policy that has the binding effect of law and is not promulgated
according to Article I's 83 bicameralism and presentment requirements,
why can Congress, an elected body, not maintain a check?
84
C. Post-Chadha Reaction
The Court's decision was made public on June 23, 1983, and had an
immediate impact. 85 In a rare gesture, Justice White rose from the bench
and provided dissenting commentary.86 The following day, the nation's
top newspapers were emblazoned with headlines announcing the
congressional circumcision.87 Washington, D.C.'s response was "near
panic," as described by one insider.88 The holding appeared to welcome
a dramatic shift in power away from the legislature to the always-
expanding and amorphous administrative state.
78. Id. at 967-68.
79. Id. at 968. A Hobson's Choice is usually referred to as "[a]n apparently free
choice that offers no real alternative." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
646 (3d ed. 1993).
80. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 972.
83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article L Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523-25, 554-56 (1992). Criticizing the Court's reasoning in Chadha, the
authors compare the lack of Article I requirements in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981). Id. Just two years prior to Chadha, the Court held that presidential
orders suspending federal litigation with Iran had the force of law, despite no action by
Congress. (citation needed). In Dames & Moore, Congress's "acquiescence" served as
approval. Id. at 524-25 citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
84. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986-89 (White, J., dissenting).
85. See Biden, supra note 8, at 686-87 (commenting on immediate reaction).
86. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 225.
87. See id. at 232 (listing day-after headlines from around the United States).
88. Biden, supra note 8, at 686 (describing reaction days after decision).
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Heeding the advice from Justice White's dissent, Congress expected
that Chadha would not be limited to the immigration context but instead
would touch all other areas of law. 89 Both Houses held hearings, the
Democratic party in the Senate immediately formed a task force, and the
Congressional Research Service provided analysis regarding the possible
effects of moving forward without the legislative veto tool.90 One
Senator and one Representative 91 took the more radical approach92 and
introduced legislation proposing a constitutional amendment to regain
the veto.93
The congressional response proved appropriate. Mere days after
Chadha, the Court summarily affirmed two cases that struck down veto
provisions. 94 This immediately confirmed Justice White's prediction that
Chadha would eliminate all legislative vetoes.95  In Process Gas
Consumers Group, the questioned provision was a one-house veto for
natural gas pricing.96  The second case denounced a two-house veto
regarding the FTC's "used car rule," thus affirming the expansive reach
of Chadha beyond immigration regulation.97
III. After the Dust Settled
After the shock of the Chadha decision subsided, the courts and
Congress were forced to address the question-what will happen to all of
the other statutes containing legislative vetoes?
One obvious response to this question hinges on the issue of
severability. Simply stated, can the legislative veto provision be severed
or cut from the rest of the statute and leave a statute that still coincides
with Congress's intent?98 In Chadha, the majority specifically addressed
this issue and adopted Buckley v. Valeo's reasoning that an invalid
89. See id. (describing congressional response).
90. Id. at 687.
91. Id. at 688 (citing Senator Dennis DeConcini's proposal of S.J. Res. 135, 98th
Cong. (1983) and Representative Andrew Jacobs, Jr.'s proposal of H.R.J. Res. 313, 98th
Cong. (1983)).
92. See Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1262 (discussing idea of constitutional
Amendment allowing legislative vetoes).
93. Biden, supra note 8, at 688.
94. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216
(1983) affd Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
U.S. Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) affd Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
95. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
96. See Process Gas, 673 F.2d at 433.
97. See William F. Leahy, The Fate of the Legislative Veto After Chadha, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 168, 169 (1984) (noting two cases generally accepted as signaling the end
of legislative vetoes across the board); see also Biden, supra note 8, at 686 ("[T]here can
be little doubt that all legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.").
98. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 112:41134
CONGRESSIONAL CREATIVITY
portion of a statue should be severed unless Congress would not have
enacted the statute without the part in question.99  To determine
congressional intent, a court must first look to whether the statue
contains a severability clause, I00 and then to the legislative history for
support or rebuttal.' 0 l  Furthermore, the severability determination
depends on whether the remaining statute is "fully operative as a law"
without the portion that has been cut.'0 2
In Chadha, the Court easily found the Immigration and Nationality
Act's severability section unambiguously permitted the legislative veto
provision to be removed from the Act, and the legislative history
supported. 10 3  Furthermore, the Court held that the Act was "fully
operative as a law"104 without the veto, and the particular section would
be treated as a "report and wait" provision. 105 In accordance with the
Act, should the Attorney General (AG) wish to suspend the deportation
of a person, the AG would report to Congress who would still have the
opportunity to pass legislation negativing the AG's order. 10 6 Of course,
this legislation would have to pass through both Houses and the
President. 10 7 The Court previously upheld "report and wait" provisions
in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.' 8
Although the majority found an easy answer to the severability
question, 10 9 Justice Rehnquist's disagreement sparked his separate
dissenting opinion."l 0 He wrote to highlight that the Act lacked the
requisite congressional intent needed to sever such a provision."' He
claimed the majority improperly read the statute as a whole, and the
legislative history supported Congress's unwillingness to give the
99. Id. at 931-32 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (citations
omitted)).
100. A severability clause is defined as: "[a] provision that keeps the remaining
provisions of a contract or statute in force if any portion of that contract or statute is
judicially declared void, unenforceable, or unconstitutional." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1141 (8th ed. 2004).
101. Seeid. at 932-35.
102. Id. at 934-35 (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S.
210, 234 (1932)); see also Leahy, supra note 97, at 180.
103. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932-35.
104. Id. at 935 & nn.8-9.
105. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL




108. See id. (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (rules not to take
effect until reported to Congress)).
109. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932 (finding language "unambiguous" and that
"Congress clearly intended").
110. See id. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. See id.
2008] 1135
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Executive such power without also reserving a veto. 1
12
Immediately after Chadha, one view was that the Court's reasoning
would likely require a case-by-case determination of severability for all
laws containing legislative vetoes. 1 3 Despite the Court's standard for
severability iterated in Chadha,1 4 the issue was difficult because: (1) it
posed a hypothetical-would Congress really have acted this way
without the veto provision?; 15 and (2) in the absence of a clear statement
in the act addressing the severability of the veto, can often-ambiguous
legislative histories provide clear intent?' 16 The result has been broad
discretion for courts to determine severability." 7
One court found a veto provision severable despite evidence in the
legislative history that there were "continuous and heated debates" on the
issue. 118 Yet, other courts have struck down entire statues, finding the
veto provisions inseverable. 119 The question seemed to find its most
steadfast answer in the holding of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock.12° The
decision has been interpreted as standing for the principle that most
legislative veto provisions are severable.' 2
Whether vetoes are severable only becomes a question for the courts
when the provisions are challenged. 122  Without a challenge, no
constitutional requirement for a case or controversy 123 is met; the result
112. Id.
113. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL
CONTROL OF REGULATION 1-2 (1983); Leahy, supra note 97, at 179.
114. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32 (majority opinion).
115. See Leahy, supra note 97, at 180.
116. See id. at 179-80; CRAIG, supra note 113, at 1-2; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 105, at § 10.8; cf Angelo G. Garubo, Comment, Severing the Legislative Veto
Provision: The Aftermath of Chadha, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 174 (1984-1985) (arguing
Chadha's congressional intent test for severability is flawed and proposing a two-part
alternative test based on nondelegation grounds and whether a reasonable method exists).
117. See Leahy, supra note 97, at 180 (citations omitted).
118. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 803 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied 469 U.S. 852, mem. (1984) (finding veto provision severable despite debate);
see also Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1182 (1984) (arguing Court's severability standard encourages lower courts to
easily cut veto provisions).
119. See Leahy, supra note 97, at 180 & n.80 citing EEOC v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984) (legislative veto inseverable, striking down entire
Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1982)); see also City of New Haven, Conn.
v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding President's deferral authority
and one-house veto inseverable).
120. 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
121. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 83, at 524 (claiming Court's application of
severability test in Alaska Airlines paves way for all legislative veto provisions to be
severed).
122. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 105, at § 10.8 (citing CRAIG, supra note
113, at 143).
123. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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leaves them on the books and part of the law.
124
Although unchallenged, Congress chose to remove some provisions
that violated Chadha's holding.125  In many cases, it replaced such
provisions with joint resolutions of approval and disapproval. 126 A joint
resolution of approval requires both Houses to give approval of executive
agency action within a specific number of days, or the initiative fails.
127
This procedure favors the legislature and is said to have the practical
effect of a negative one-house veto.128 A joint resolution of disapproval
requires both Houses to react to an initiative and disapprove or vote
against it. 129  This procedure favors the executive because Congress's
action is still subject to executive veto.
130
Specifically, Congress replaced legislative vetoes with joint
resolutions in statutes affecting: D.C. Home Rule (joint resolution of
disapproval), 131 executive reorganization (joint resolution of approval),
132
national emergencies (joint resolution of disapproval), 133  export
administration (joint resolution of disapproval), 134 and federal pay (joint
resolution of disapproval)135 .
124. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 287 n.80 (citing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2159(b)-(f) (1988) containing legislative veto and still in existence). But cf
EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (holding one-
house veto unconstitutional even though not exercised).
125. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 121; see also FISHER, supra note 5, at
101; David Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 97 (1997); Herz, supra note 7, at 319 (reconsidering Chadha in light
of the Republican takeover of Congress from 1992-1994).
126. See sources cited supra note 125.
127. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 101;Fisher, supra note 7, at 286.
128. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 101-02 (explaining if one House withdraws support,
its action is inaction and does not fail under Chadha, while prior to Chadha, one House
had to act to express disapproval); Fisher, supra note 7, at 286.
129. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 101; Fisher, supra note 7, at 286 (discussing how
burden shifts to Congress to act if it finds initiative objectionable, yet still vulnerable to
President's veto).
130. See sources cited supra notes 129.
131. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 286 & n.70 (citing Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 131, 98 Stat. 1945,
1973 (1984)).
132. See id. at 286 (citing Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192
(1984)).
133. See id. (citing Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987,
Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 801, 99 Stat. 405, 448 (1985)).
134. See id. (citing Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
64, § 301(b), 99 Stat. 120, 160 (1985)).
135. See id. (citing Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, § 135(e), 99 Stat. 1322 (1985)).
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A. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
Despite Chadha and its progeny's prohibition on legislative vetoes,
Congress continued to include them in legislation, and Presidents
continued to sign them. 136 One of the foremost scholars'3 7 in the field
claims, from the time of the Chadha decision on June 23, 1983, through
1999, more than four hundred new vetoes were enacted. 138 At times,
Presidents Reagan, Bush (I), and Clinton balked at the
unconstitutionality of such provisions but nevertheless signed them into
law. 139
This begs the question: why sign them into law in light of the
Court's holding in Chadha? Logically, the answer might lie in the nature
of the legislative veto itself, combined with the need for compromise in
the lawmaking process. Addressing the latter first, a President may find
the proverbial forest much more important that the individual tree that is
the veto provision. In other words, he is willing to sign the bill, knowing
that it contains an unconstitutional legislative veto in order to implement
a broader agenda. 140  In addition, the President holds the Chadha
decision as a trump card should Congress try to enforce the veto.
In returning to the first aspect, the construct of a veto, it can easily
be viewed as harmless in a post-Chadha landscape. A veto is a sort of
rules review 141 that only comes to life when Congress so desires, rather
136. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 121; FISHER, supra note 5, at 102.
137. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Preface to the Third Edition of FISHER & DEVINS,
supra note 34, at ix. Louis Fisher was a Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers at the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and currently works in the
Law Library at the Library of Congress. Id. He has testified before congressional
committees on various areas including the legislative veto, pocket veto, executive
privilege, and his resume includes more than 260 publications in law reviews, journals,
magazines, newspapers, and edited books. Id.
138. Telephone Interview with Louis Fisher, Law Library, Library of Congress, (Jan.
6, 2007) (stating most legislative vetoes are included in budget/appropriations bills for
agencies and at current date have likely been over 500 enacted); see FISHER & DEVINS,
supra note 34, at 121; FISHER, supra note 5, at 102; Halstead, supra note 9, at 20
("Congress has continued to pass legislation imposing facially invalid legislative veto
provisions.").
139. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 102; see also FISHER & DEV1NS, supra note 34, at
121 (noting many of the new legislative vetoes required executive to get approval from
committees and provides examples such as Forest Service, IRS, and Federal Buildings
Fund); Breyer, supra note 39, at 789 ("Every modern President has criticized the
legislative veto in principle and questioned its constitutionality .. " (citing Watson,
supra note 23, at 1002-29)).
140. The President may sign the bill for any number of reasons, including efficiency
or because there is no objection to the rest of the bill.
141. See Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules:
Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto, " 32 ADMIN L. REv. 667, 667 (1980) (discussing
legislative veto as mechanism to disapprove administrative rules); see also HARVARD L.
REV. ASS'N, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: I. Constitutional Law, 97 HARV. L. REv.
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than pro-active substantive law. Therefore, constitutional concerns only
arise when the veto is put to use.
B. Below the Surface, the Legislative Veto Still Functions
While a President might view the post-Chadha veto as harmless and
announce through signing statements that it will have no legal effect,
142
difficulty still arises at the ground level. 143  An agency's lifeblood
revolves around Congress's will, not the President's. 1 44  Fisher notes,
"[a]lthough the President may treat committee vetoes as having no legal
force or effect, agencies have a different attitude. They have to live with
their review committees, year after year, and have a much greater
incentive to make accommodations and stick by them."'145  In fact,
Congress need not enforce a veto for it to have an impact. 46 It can use
the provisions "to leverage informal compliance from executive
agencies, the implicit message being that the affected agency may face
difficulties in the legislative, oversight or budgetary processes if it does
not accede to congressional will in this context."'' 47 Despite inclusion in
the executive branch, agencies are subject to various controls by
Congress.
48
Three post-Chadha examples highlight the struggle between
presidential condemnation of the legislative veto and an agency's desire
to maintain a positive relationship with congressional overseers.
149
Instead of congressional action occurring in plain sight, the legislative
vetoes were "driven ... underground."'
150
1. National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA)
In 1984, a conflict arose after President Reagan signed an
70, 185 (1983) (describing it as congressional review procedure).
142. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 102 (citing Presidents Reagan, Bush (I), and
Clinton's comments found in their presidential signing statements, highlighting
unconstitutionality of veto provisions); see also infra Part V.
143. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 288 (discussing agencies' dependence on
congressional controls).
144. See id. (citing agencies' dependence on congressional controls); see also FISHER,
supra note 5, at 104 (noting Congress's stake in administrative matters).
145. Fisher, supra note 7, at 288.
146. Id.
147. Halstead, supra note 9, at 20.
148. See infra Parts III.D.1-2.
149. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 288-91 (discussing three examples of informal
legislative vetoes and effect on executive).
150. Id. at 288 ("The effect of Chadha was to drive some of the committee vetoes
underground, where they operate on the basis of informal and nonstatutory
understandings."); see also Rossi, supra note 17, at 1184.
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appropriations bill targeted for the Department of Housing & Urban
Development and accompanying independent agencies. 5' The bill
contained seven legislative vetoes that required agencies to obtain
approval by the Appropriations Committee prior to taking action."' In
his signing statement, Reagan made clear that he would follow Chadha,
the legislative vetoes had no legal effect, and the affected agencies need
not abide by the bill's directive.'" Rather than veto the entire statute,
President Reagan sought to draw attention to the parts that were
seemingly unconstitutional and advised that the administration would
treat them as void.
154
Congress quickly responded to the situation. 155  It reviewed a
procedure that had worked well with NASA, an agency affected by the
appropriations bill.1 56 The procedure placed statutory ceilings on NASA
spending, and NASA could only exceed the limits should it gain
permission from the Appropriations Committee. 157 President Reagan's
announcement that he would ignore the committee vetoes 158 created a
conflict between NASA and Congress. 159 NASA wanted the continued
flexibility of altering its spending when unforeseen issues arose.1 60 The
Agency feared a significant impact to research and development if
required to pass a bill through both Houses and the President every time
it needed more funds. 161 Congress, on the other hand, had the leverage in
this situation. It had two options: (1) try to maintain the status quo-
keeping the advantage; or (2) agree to drop the committee veto but also
require NASA to go through the entire legislative process 16 2 each time it
needed more money.163
Faced with a situation familiar to many agencies, NASA, under
151. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 288-89.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 288, 289, & nn.86-87 (citing Statement by President Ronald Reagan
Upon Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, 1984 (II) PUB. PAPERS 1056-57 (July 18, 1984)).
154. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 99-100.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 100; Fisher, supra note 7, at 289.
157. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 289.
158. See Statement by Reagan, 1984 (II) PUB. PAPERS 1056-57 (July 18, 1984).
159. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 100.
160. Id.
161. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 289 & n.89 (citing Letter from James M. Beggs,
Administrator of NASA, to Congressman Edward P. Boland, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Committee on
Appropriations (Aug. 9, 1984) (on file with LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.)).
162. See id. at 289 & n.88 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-916, at 48 (1984) (Appropriations
Committee's threat to repeal veto and NASA authority to exceed spending ceilings)); see
also FISHER, supra note 5, at 100 (discussing NASA situation).
163. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 100.
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Administrator James M. Beggs, sought a compromise. 164 Beggs wrote to
both appropriations committees and suggested that the spending caps be
placed in conference reports, not public law, and promised that NASA
would not surpass the spending limit without obtaining prior approval
from the Appropriations Committees.16' Fisher notes, "[the] letter
reveals the pragmatic sense of give-and-take that is customary between
executive agencies and congressional committees" in light of Chadha.'
66
Although the letter is not legally binding, NASA continues to respect the
agreement. 67 The letter serves as an "informal rather than statutory"
legislative veto. 168 Despite Chadha's prohibition on vetoes, Congress
and NASA acquiesce in a nonstatutory agreement that has the same
effect. 1
69
2. Agency for International Development (AID)
A situation a few years later also illustrates the informal procedures
used when an agency rejects compromise. 170 In 1987, James C. Miller,
III, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), "stirred
up a hornet's nest"1 71 when he rejected a statutory provision requiring the
Administration to obtain written prior approval before transferring
foreign assistance funds from one account to another.172 Miller claimed
the law, requiring the Appropriations Committees to sign off before the
AID could transfer funds between accounts, violated Chadha.173  The
House Appropriations Committee replied just as it did in the NASA
situation: it was willing to drop the veto, but it would also drop the
agency's authority to act. 17 4 The AID "let out a howl," fearing a new
rigid framework, the OMB retreated. 75  Congress then enacted the
committee veto into law. 176 Destined for change, Miller challenged the
164. See id.; Fisher, supra note 7, at 289.
165. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 289 & n.89 (citing Letter from Beggs, supra note
161).
166. FISHER, supra note 5, at 100.
167. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 290.
168. FISHER, SUpra note 5, at 100.
169. Id. at 100-0 1 (describing compromise as falling outside the confines of Chadha
yet having consistent legal effect).
170. See id. at 102-03; Fisher, supra note 7, at 290; Rossi, supra note 17, at 1184.
171. FISHER, supra note 5, at 102.
172. See id. 102-03; Fisher, supra note 7, at 290; Rossi, supra note 17, at 1184.
173. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 290 & n.91 (citing Edward Walsh, OMB Objection
Raises House Panel's Hackles, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1987, at A 13).
174. See id. at 290 (in this case the agency would move from a restricted ability to
transfer foreign assistance funds to no authority at all).
175. FiSHER, supra note 5, at 103.
176. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 290 & n.93 (citing Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514,
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practice the following year. 177 This time, Congress "followed through on
its threat" and removed the veto and the agency's transfer authority. 
78
The two bodies later reached a compromise, with Congress deleting
the veto but not without the administration agreeing to follow
notification procedures. 179  Although the agreement was not legally
binding, the agency understood a future challenge would likely lead to a
decrease in power. 180 It is "[b]ecause Congress wields the heavy stick of
budget and lawmaking powers over executive branch agencies, informal
committee vetoes continue to survive in many subject-specific contexts
at the federal level.''8
3. Baker Accord
A third situation demonstrates a "dramatic example"' 82 of a "side
agreement"' 183 that works a compromise without violating Chadha.184 As
Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, James A. Baker,
III, suggested 185 giving four congressional committees veto power over
humanitarian funds sought by the Administration for Nicaraguan
Contras. 186  The compromise gave the Administration its non-military
funds, but not without an informal agreement that the funds would only
be released with the approval of the four committees and other
congressional leaders.' 87 Despite opposition,188 and a federal lawsuit,'89
101 Stat. 1329-331, 1329-155 (1987)).
177. See id. at 290.
178. See id.
179. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 103; Fisher, supra note 7, at 290 & n.94.
180. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 103; Fisher, supra note 7, at 290; Rossi, supra note
17, at 1184 & n.85 (citations omitted).
181. Rossi, supra note 17, at 1184-85 & n.86 (citing Michael A. Fitts, The Foibles of
Formalism: Applying a Political "Transaction Cost" Analysis to Separation of Powers,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1513, 1513-14 (1991)).
182. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 122.
183. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 103 (characterizing the compromise as a "side
agreement" as opposed to a statutory directive).
184. See id.; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 122-23; Fisher, supra note 7, at 291.
185. Compromise known as the Baker Accord. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34,
at 122 (citing Letter from James A. Baker, III, United States Secretary of State, to James
Wright, Speaker of United States House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 1989)).
186. See id. (citing Letter from Baker, supra note 185).
187. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 103; Fisher, supra note 7, at 291 (citing Letter from
Baker, supra note 185).
188. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 291 (citing White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray's
objection to the agreement as an unconstitutional veto in David Hoffman & Ann
Devroy's, Bush Counsel Contests Contra Aid Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1989, at A5.
He also cites Robert H. Bork's comment that the Baker Accord was "even more
objectionable" than the veto in Chadha because it allowed control by committees, rather




the informal agreement prevailed.' 90
C. Congressional Setback
Although Congress has had some success using informal legislative
veto procedures,' 9' the Court has been cautious in allowing statutory
procedures that are a rose by another name. 192  In Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc. (MMWA), 193 the issue was whether Congress had violated
INS v. Chadha 94 and Bowsher v. Synar 195 through an authority-
transferring act. 196 The Act transferred control of National and Dulles
Airports from the Federal Government to the Commonwealth of Virginia
and the District of Columbia on the condition that they would establish a
Board of Directors to manage operations. 197 In addition, Congress would
create a review board, made up of nine members of Congress, to serve in
their individual capacities. 98  This board would maintain veto power
(over the Board of Directors) in major decisions previously handled by
the Federal Aviation Administration. 199
In light of Chadha and its progeny, the conditional veto power is
clearly unconstitutional.2 °0  If the authority granted to the Board of
Directors was executive, it violated Bowsher, if the authority was
189. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 103 & n.106 (citing Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp.
1550 (D.D.C. 1989) (suit by four members of Congress dismissed for lack of standing)).
190. See id. at 103; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 123.
191. See supra Parts III.B.1-3 (discussing NASA, AID, and the Baker Accord).
192. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act II, sc.ii ("What's in a name?
That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet."); see also HARVARD
L. REV. ASS'N, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177,
211 (Nov. 1991) (describing Congress's legislation that sparked Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991), as a
"last-ditch effort" and that "Congress engineered the use of a cloaked legislative veto").
193. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
194. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
195. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
196. See MWAA, 501 U.S. at 255 & n.1 (citing Metropolitan Washington Airports Act
of 1986, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2451-61 (1986)).
197. See49 U.S.C. §§ 2451-61.
198. Id.
199. See MWAA, 501 U.S. at 255.
200. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 168-69 (1994) (discussing law's validity, author
sarcastically asks, "[h]ow many ways can one Act violate the Constitution?"); see also
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1735 (1996)
(addressing unconstitutionality of act); HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N (1990), supra note 192,
at 211 & n.64 (citing the Department of Justice's pre-decision opinion to Congress
warning that law would invoke Constitution's bicameralism and presentment
requirements).
11432008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
legislative, it violated Chadha. °1
D. Alternatives to the Legislative Veto
The debate over legislative vetoes is one of control.20 2 Should
Congress have at its disposal a mechanism to check agency action?
20 3
For over seventy-five years,20 4 Congress has tried to maintain the balance
of delegating broad authority to administrative agencies while attempting
to keep their behavior in-line with congressional intent.20 5
Reverting back to Justice White's concerns, he claimed that
Congress was left with a choice after Chadha: (1) it could legislate with
scientific exactitude; or (2) hand over its lawmaking ability to the
20executive. 06 Congress has not followed either "choice." Despite being
successful 20 7 and unsuccessful,20 8 Congress has continued to use the
legislative veto,20 9 but it has also relied on other statutory and
nonstatutory or informal ways to control agency behavior.
210
1. Statutory Controls
Legislating through traditional means is the most obvious way to
21check agency action. Congress can either proceed through proactive
or reactive means in addressing an issue.212 Proactively, Congress could
201. See MWAA, 501 U.S. at 275 (Bowsher held that agents of Congress cannot
execute laws, a power reserved for the executive branch. Chadha held that Congress
cannot exercise legislative power to enact laws without going through Article I's
bicameralism and presentment requirements).
202. See HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N, supra note 192, at 206 (noting Congress inserted
vetoes to maintain control over decision-making).
203. See id.
204. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-70 (White, J., dissenting).
205. See id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political
Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 671-72 (1992)
("The goal of Congress is to ensure that administrative agencies generate outcomes that
are consistent with the original understanding that existed between Congress and...
parties to the initial political compromise.").
206. See id. at 968 (although he had various concerns, specifically referring to his
reference to a "Hobson's choice").
207. See infra Part II.B.1-3 (discussing NASA, AID, Baker Accord).
208. See MMWA v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252
(1991) (striking down Congress's use of procedure mirroring legislative veto).
209. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 121; FISHER, supra note 5, at 102.
210. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 71-83; Kaiser, supra note 141, at 667-69.
211. See Kaiser, supra note 141, at 667 (calling it the most direct means). By
"traditional" I am referring to procedures governed by Article I's bicameralism and
presentment provisions.
212. These distinctions are used to merely differentiate between congressional




attempt to create an agency in such a way as to build-in control.213 In a
reactive approach, Congress uses legislation to monitor and direct agency
behavior.
2 14
Although most commentators agree that legislating with specificity
is an effective way to restrict agencies from betraying congressional
intent,215 Congress can hardwire 216 agencies from the outset. Professor
Macey argues that "not only by establishing the procedural and
substantive rules under which the administrative agencies operate, but
also through the original organizational design of the agency itself,"
Congress can control future agency behavior.217 Congress has the ability
to structure an agency in the manner most advantageous to its ability to
control.21 8 Although future adaptation is likely needed from the outset,
Congress can define the powers, determine compensation and number of
personnel,219 place limitations on the duration of the agency's
existence, 2 0 and generally set the parameters of access to the agency.22'
Statutory control through the monitoring process accounts for
greater impact on agencies.2 2 Congress reacts, rather than anticipates,
using its lawmaking powers to coalesce agency behavior with its
223intent. As noted, the most effective way to counter undesirable agency
action is to pass specific overriding legislation. 224  Congress also has
various other statutory tools that are clearly constitutional such as: amend
the jurisdiction of the agency, 225 place ceilings and floors on agency
213. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 71 (discussing congressional means to direct
administrative matters); see also Macey, supra note 205, at 671-74 (discussing methods
Congress can utilize control during statutory formation of agency).
214. See Macey, supra note 205, at 671-73 (briefly comparing enforcement and
monitoring procedures to structuring agency to maximize congressional control).
215. See Biden, supra note 8, at 689 (Congress put intent into words through careful
legislative drafting); Elliott, supra note 12, at 154-55 (best to legislate with greatest
specificity, when possible); Kaiser, supra note 141, at 669 (most effective and direct
means to overcome agency action is through explicit legislation); Smith & Struve, supra
note 8, at 1261 (alternative to legislative veto is legislating with greater specificity and
clearer standards).
216. Macey, supra note 205, at 673.
217. See id. (citing Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 96 (1992)).
218. See id.
219. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 71.
220. See id.; see also Biden, supra note 8, at 690-91 (discussing "sunset" legislation
as affective means to regulate agency action); HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N, supra note 192,
at 193 (keep agencies in check by imposing durational limits or "sunset" laws); Smith &
Struve, supra note 8, at 1262 ("sunset" legislation as congressional tool).
221. See Macey, supra note 205, at 671-73.
222. See id. at 673.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
225. See Leahy, supra note 97, at 190 (citing Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional
Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the Chadha Decision, 36 ADMIN. L. REV.
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personnel, 226 require agencies to notify Congress before they take any
action, 227 mandate consultation with other agencies, 228 require prior
congressional review to proposed rules, 229 and, most importantly, control
appropriations.23 °  Congressional authorization of funds, ability to
conduct audits of agency spending, and overall monitoring of funds
appropriated to agencies give Congress significant leverage.231 Budget
reductions or sharp spending limitations can potentially deadlock an
agency's ability to function-an essential tool in the congressional
toolbox.232
Statutory checks on agency action carry obvious strengths and
weaknesses. They are self-enforcing, legally binding, and if written with
specificity, can provide clear direction to the agency.233 Statutory
provisions are easier to enforce because they are backed with the force of
law and serve as a mandate. Yet, in comparison to either the legislative
veto or nonstatutory/informal mechanisms, lawmaking can be time-
consuming and cumbersome, 234 linguistically difficult, 235 lack immediacy
and efficiency, 236 and from a congressional point-of-view, always remain
subject to presidential veto.
23 7
239 (1984)); Kaiser, supra note 141, at 673-87 (alter jurisdiction by: removing express
areas of regulation from agency head, creating moratoriums on certain rulemaking,
transfer jurisdiction from one agency to another, or deregulating an area; author provides
fifteen examples of jurisdictional modifications).
226. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 88-91. Fisher discusses Congress's monitoring of
personnel levels to secure legislative priorities. Id. Congress often finds itself at odds
with the OMB because of its ability to restrict the number of agency personnel. Id. This
affects the ability of the agency to spend its appropriated funds and promulgate effective
policy. Id.
227. See Leahy, supra note 97, at 190 (citing Kaiser, supra note 225, at 263-65).
228. See Kaiser, supra note 141, at 668.
229. See id.
230. See Biden, supra note 8, at 689; Breyer, supra note 39, at 792; FISHER, supra
note 5, at 75-76; Kaiser, supra note 141, at 687-96 (citing eight examples of past
appropriations controls).
231. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 75-76 (Congress's power of the purse includes
appropriation, auditing, and monitoring while having very few restrictions placed on its
power by the judiciary); see also Elliott, supra note 12, at 157 (after listing various
alternatives to the legislative veto, he singles out the appropriations rider, which has the
effect of prohibiting an agency from using funds for a specific purpose, as the one most
similar to the veto. Although the rider is still subject to presidential veto, as a practical
matter it is highly unlikely due to the difficulty of passing modem budgets.).
232. See Kaiser, supra note 225, at 252 (limiting appropriations provisions may
"effectively nullifly] or severely restrict[] an agency's operating authority in [a]
specialized area .... ").
233. See Kaiser, supra note 141, at 668.
234. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 793.
235. See id. at 792-93.
236. See Kaiser, supra note 141, at 668.
237. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 793 ("so much harder to enact a new law"); Elliott,




In addition to statutory checks, Congress also exercises numerous
nonstatutory/informal controls.238 Although it is nearly impossible to
catalogue every way Congress directs agency behavior,239  and
quantifying congressional oversight has proved a difficult task,24° certain
informal tactics are deemed effective.241 To further its agenda, Congress
242has used language in committee reports, instructions made during
243committee hearings, correspondence sent from congresspersons to
committee and subcommittee heads,2 44 and oversight hearings245 .
Although informal measures do not pack the punch of a statue, they
serve as serious threats for agency compliance.246 They are readily
available and easily implemented, 247 and have the ability to manipulate a
positive outcome because overall, agencies seek to avoid collisions with
oversight.248
must survive President's veto); see also HARVARD L. REV. Ass'N, supra note 192, at 213
(describing increased burden on Congress).
238. See Biden, supra note 8, at 668 (Congress has ample other means for controlling
agencies); FISHER, supra note 5, at 78-80; Kaiser, supra note 225, at 266 ("Congress
possesses a panoply of nonstatutory techniques.").
239. See Kaiser, supra note 141, at 669 (nearly impossible to provide comprehensive
and exhaustive list).
240. See Greene, supra note 200, at 132 & n.30 (citing various studies standing for
the proposition that measuring the impact of congressional oversight is difficult and
inexact practice). But cf Kaiser, supra note 225, at 266 & n. 116 (citing studies that show
informal controls "can be effective, if used diligently and under conducive
circumstances.").
241. See Kaiser, supra note 225, at 266 (highlighting importance of nonstatutory
controls but citing the difficulty in measuring the impact of one single device due to the
interweaving of other factors in the process).
242. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 78-79; Kaiser, supra note 225, at 266-68 (calling
committee reports one of most effective nonstatutory controls because they are the
product of the group that keeps closest watch on particular agency).
243. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 78-79.
244. See id.; see also supra Parts III.B. 1-2 (NASA and AID).
245. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 78-79; Elliott, supra note 12, at 157 & n.161 (citing
Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control ofAdministrative Regulation:
A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1423 (1977) for the idea that
"embarrassing oversight hearings" have an impact on agency behavior); Kaiser, supra
note 225, at 268-69 (citing example of highly publicized investigatory hearings having
impact on agencies).
246. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 79 ("To ignore [nonstatutory] controls invites
Congress to cut agency budgets and add restrictive statutory language."); Macey, supra
note 205, at 672 n.4 (citing Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz's, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165
(1984) (describing investigatory oversight hearings as beneficial method to pressure
agency compliance)).
247. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 157. But cf Kaiser, supra note 225, at 268
("Informal techniques alone rarely produce an immediate, dramatic impact.").
248. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 78-80.
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IV. The Legislative Veto's Fit In Our Constitutional Structure
Despite Justice White's predictions,249 congressional vitality after
Chadha has not ground to a halt. Pre-Chadha legislative vetoes were
clearly an efficient and effective tool to overrule agency action.250 While
post-Chadha vetoes have been enacted,251 they are used more covertly or
in an informal or underground manner.252 In light of our constitutional
structure, built-in checks and balances, separation of powers elements, as
well as specifically proscribed procedures, is our system more or less
preferable253 without the unconstitutional2 54 legislative vetoes? Although
the Framers could hardly have anticipated our modem administrative
state,2 55 does the post-Chadha framework leave Congress with necessary
tools to maintain the balance of power with the executive in the
policymaking arena? In analyzing arguments by opponents, who favor
the ban on legislative vetoes, and proponents, who favor legislative
vetoes, the subsequent analysis seeks to answer the questions posed
above regarding a more preferable system.
A. Opponents of the Legislative Veto
In discussing opposition to the legislative veto, it is prudent to begin
with Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Chadha. In what is
generally referred to as a formalistic 256 approach,257 Burger begins with
249. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (predicting
that Congress will be left with a choice between writing laws with specificity to cover
every possible circumstance and handing over its lawmaking powers to the executive).
250. See id. at 944 (majority opinion) (referring to legislative veto as "efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating the functions of government"); Breyer, supra note
39, at 788 ("The veto offered the most direct and effective guarantee that delegation
would not drain power from Congress."); HARVARD L. REV. ASs'N, supra note 192, at
213 (describing legislative vetoes as "more practical" and providing "balanced,
condensed, and time-efficient bargaining").
251. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 102; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 34, at 121;
Telephone Interview with Fisher, supra note 138 and accompanying text.
252. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1184; see also Fisher, supra note 7, at 288 ("The
effect of Chadha was to drive some of the committee vetoes underground, where they
operate on the basis of informal and nonstatutory understandings.").
253. By the using the word "preferable" I am alluding to a system of government that
functions most closely with the democratic principles and the ideals of government
fashioned by the Framers of the Constitution.
254. Referring to use of vetoes prior to Chadha.
255. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 978 (White, J., dissenting) (calling the modem
administrative state "an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers").
256. See Flaherty, supra note 200, at 1734. Professor Flaherty describes formalism's
characteristics as:
[T]hree discrete branches, each exercising one of three distinct powers. The
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, with certain carefully crafted
exceptions, each controls its own domain, unconstrained by its counterparts.
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the premise that Congress may only legislate in compliance with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution. 258 His
next premise asserts that the veto provision was legislation because "it
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, ''259 and "had the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha,
all outside the Legislative Branch. 26° Since the veto was legislation,
lacked bicameralism and presentment, and did not fit into any of the
exceptions in the Constitution that allow one House to act alone,261 it was
unconstitutional.262 Justice Burger's rationale firmly adheres to the letter
of the Constitution and strays from the separation of powers arguments
that consider the frequency of use and legislative importance of the
veto.
263
Other opponents have taken a more functional approach, focusing
on the effect the legislative veto has had on Congress-the most
democratically elected branch.2 4  One commentator argues "[t]he
Chadha decision.., has done Congress a service. 2 65 Congress took the
new266 invention "too far, too fast '
267 and seemingly went "hog-wild" 268
For the executive, ultimate control rests with the President. No less
importantly, formalist precepts consider legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, which mark the proper domains of their respective branches, to be
readily identifiable. The domain of executive power is especially broad under
this approach, amounting almost by default to any governmental action distinct
from passing a statute or adjudicating a case.
Id.
257. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 324
(2nd ed. 2002); Breyer, supra note 39, at 790; Flaherty, supra note 200, at 1734.
258. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58 (majority opinion).
259. Id. at 952.
260. Id.
261. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 790 & n.41 (providing exceptions: U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2 (internal congressional rules); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 (Senate's power to
approve appointments and ratify treaties); id. art. I, § 2, cl.5 (House's power to impeach);
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Senate's power to try impeachments)).
262. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-55.
263. See id.
264. Biden, supra note 8, at 693; see also Elliott, supra note 12, at 162-63 (in the long
run it will be beneficial because Congress will be forced to explore alternatives rather
than relying on veto).
I refer to Congress as the most democratically elected branch because they are
elected through direct vote rather than the Electoral College system.
265. Biden, supra note 8, at 693.
266. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 789 (describing legislative veto as new and appeal
has grown by "leaps and bounds").
267. CRAIG, supra note 11, at 231.
268. Id. See also Biden, supra note 8, at 691 ("Over its fifty-one year history the
legislative veto became a classic example of a good idea that was overextended to the
breaking point."); Elliott, supra note 12, at 162 ("Congress has been writing legislative
vetoes into statutes where the need for the veto is weak at best." (citation omitted)).
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in its application. It gave Congress the ability to pass on difficult or
controversial decisions by delegating the policymaking to agencies,
while reserving a veto, should it disagree with the outcome.269  In
addition, a Congress faced with making more difficult policy decisions
likely means a more informed Congress. 270 Although such theories
employ an arguable premise,27' congressional tactics aimed at dodging
problematic decisions would seem to stray from basic constitutional
ideas of representative government.
A more representative legislative body is exactly what some cite as
a positive outcome of the veto ban.272 With the veto intact, many
decisions were conducted behind closed doors273 by a select group of
congresspersons and staffers.274 This procedure led to what some claim
as over-influence by special interest. 27 5  It is much easier, from a
lobbying standpoint, to focus your efforts on a few elected officials and
269. See Biden, supra note 8, at 685 (veto tempts Congress to pass on difficult
legislative work); Elliott, supra note 12, at 154 (vetoes allow Congress to broadly
delegate and pass on important legislation by "evading direct responsibility" (citation
omitted)); see also Richard J. Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1989) (legislators decline
to make tough policy decisions because it may cost them constituent support).
270. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 151-52 (vetoes prevent informed decision making
and in addition, subcommittee hearings are rarely held and committee reports rarely
written for veto resolutions); Macey, supra note 205, at 697 (discussing affect of over-
reliance on bureaucracy).
271. The premise stems from the notion that a Congress that makes more policy
decisions through legislation, rather than delegation to agencies, is more in-line with our
constitutional ideas of democracy.
272. See infra notes 273-77.
273. See Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1259 (procedures conducted outside of
public eye).
274. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 158 (arguing veto ban is not a great loss since it
takes power out of hands of congressional staff-a body that should not be responsible
with "unreviewable power over Executive and agency decisionmaking"); Richard J.
Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 469, 483 (1985):
Thus, the practical effect of the legislative veto was not to give greater control
over agency policy making to the most majoritarian branch of government-
Congress. Rather, the most significant effect of the legislative veto was to
enhance the power over agency policy making of the few individual legislators
who occupied positions of strategic significance on the committees with
jurisdiction over those agencies.
See also Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1259 ("actual power was wielded by committee
staffs").
275. See Biden, supra note 8, at 689 (eliminating veto helps to rid Capitol Hill of
lobbyists and special interest that became key members of policy making process
surrounding vetoes); see also Macey, supra note 205, at 694 (arguing that process is more
democratic without veto because it "pushes the lawmaking process in a more public-
regarding direction by advantaging poorly organized groups relative to well-organized




staff, rather than Congress as a whole. Interest groups would have the
ability to affect policy while passing under the radar, rather than being
forced to participate in a more public lawmaking process.2 7 6 Without the
veto, Congress works more in the public eye, leading to greater
accountability and control by the people who elect them.
277
Despite its efficiency, the veto was criticized as causing bad
policymaking.278  In opposition to the veto, the American Bar
Association (ABA) charged that the "veto encourages an ad hoc, after-
the-fact, piecemeal formulation of policy.' '279 Furthermore, its use "has
been sporadic and unpredictable. '280  Absent the agency override,
Congress, the agencies, and the public benefit from clearer standards
through more specific and particularized legislation. 8'
B. Proponents of the Legislative Veto
Support for the legislative veto resonates strongly from the
dissenting opinion of Justice White.282 Generally characterized as a
functionalist 283 position, White's analysis focuses on the Constitution's
276. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 153 (citing former FTC Chairman, the veto "invites
an affected industry to try its case in a political forum rather than go through the
painstaking process of building a record and arguing its case on the merits" (citation
omitted)).
277. See Pierce, supra note 269, at 1250 ("Legislative control mechanisms such as
those held invalid in Chadha ... pose a serious threat to the people's ability to control
their agents." (citing Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 245, at 1412-14)).
278. See generally Biden, supra note 8 (lack of veto forces Congress to improve as
legislative branch and legislate with great specificity and accountability).
279. See Smith & Struve, supra note 8, at 1259 (discussing ABA's amicus curiae
brief in Chadha case).
280. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 274, at 483 (calling use "sporadic" and
"haphazard").
281. See generally Elliott, supra note 12 (discussing more notice and openness in
communications after veto's ban).
282. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1013 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting).
283. See Flaherty, supra note 200, at 1736-37. Professor Flaherty describes
functionalism, in this context:
The functional approach voices particular concern for maintaining a basic
equilibrium among the branches. The very term "functionalist" ... stems from
the inquiry into how a given device like the legislative veto functions to hinder
this type of more broadly defined goal. The formalist views devices that do not
comport with a rigid tripartite division as hindering the purposes of separation
of powers by definition. The functionalist is not so sure. To her, the
Constitution does not inhibit, and even invites, the legislature, the executive,
and the judiciary to share power in creative ways. So long as the arrangements
that emerge do not upset the specified design at the top of the structure, and so
long as they do not infringe the basic and strongly implied goals of separation
of powers, what emerges is fair game.
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284inherent separation of powers doctrine. To him, this "indispensable
political invention ... allows the President and Congress to resolve
major constitutional and policy differences, assures the accountability of
independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' [sic] control
over lawmaking., 285  These advantages, he opines, must be taken into
account in the evaluation of the veto.286
Unlike the majority, White seems to view the Constitution, and
especially the relationships between the three branches, as a system of
balancing and flexibility, noting that the separation of powers doctrine
has a history of "accommodation and practicality. ' 287 He cites Buckley
for the proposition that the "Constitution does not contemplate total
separation of the three branches of Government. 288 To White, there is
no "hermetic seal[]. 289 Rather, the inquiry into whether the balance of
power has been tipped should focus on whether the action prevents
another branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned duties.
290
Therefore, viewing Chadha through this lens, it is not surprising
that White focused on the use291 and necessit y2 92 of the veto. Although
somewhat overzealous in his delivery, White expresses reservations that
293Congress will be left without a realistic or desirable alternative.
Conjuring the observations of Justice Jackson, he believes this tool is
imperative in keeping the balance of power in light of an administrative
state that "ha[s] become a veritable fourth branch of Government, which
has deranged our three-branch legal theories. 294
Much of the criticism surrounding the veto's ban has echoed the
same sentiments-Congress needs this mechanism to check the massive
295administrative state. Supporters argue that the Court's formalistic
284. See generally Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1013 (White, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 972-73.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 999.
288. See id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)).
289. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121).
290. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1000 (White, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 71 1-12 (1974)).
291. See id. at 974 (historically the legislative veto "has not been a sword with which
Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches" but
instead has been used as a "means of self defense ... to fulfill its designated role ... as
lawmaker.").
292. See id. at 967 (veto's "importance to Congress can hardly be overstated").
293. See id. at 973 & n. 10 ("While Congress could write certain statutes with greater
specificity, it is unlikely that this is a realistic or even desirable substitute for the
legislative veto.").
294. See id. at 984 (citing FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting)).
295. See Greene, supra note 200, at 125 & n.9 (providing an extensive list of
commentaries addressing formalism versus functionalism debate).
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stance is too inflexible,296 greatly confining the meaning of Article I,
Section 7.297 Painting with a wide brush, the opinion is overbroad and
reveals the Court's misunderstanding of the executive-legislative
relationship and the subtleties of the legislative process.298
The Court ignores the practical necessities of the veto and the intent
of the Framers in light of monumental administrative growth.299
Although the Framers might view the legislative veto as unconstitutional,
what would they think about the current administrative landscape? Many
argue the veto is consistent with the Framers' intent.300  Agencies
currently perform functions the Framers expected Congress would carry
O t301.out.
3°
Looking back, some believe "the New Deal changed Article I,
Section 7 and generated constitutional legitimacy of the legislative veto
as a nonusurpative congressional response to the new imbalance created
by the President's influence over post-enactment lawmaking. 30 2  The
argument then logically flows: since the meaning of 1-7 has been altered,
resulting in executive branch lawmaking with expanded capabilities,
Congress needs something to check this power, and a mechanism such as
the legislative veto is the method.30 3  In light of the changed
circumstances, supporters believe the veto is not only necessary, it is
constitutional.304
Beyond its necessity, some have the opinion that the legislative veto
is a democratic check and "may provide the maximum possible
democratic input., 30 5  It allows Congress, a democratically elected
branch, to check administrative agencies, a large, unelected, and often
unaccountable, group that possesses lawmaking power.
30 6
Rather than providing more notice and better clarity to the public,
296. See HARVARD L. REV. Ass'N, supra note 192, at 189-90 (majority "left no room
for realistic or practical considerations").
297. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1183 n.77 (citing list of commentaries critical of
Chadha's formalism).
298. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 292.
299. See HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N, supra note 192, at 206.
300. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 83; Greene, supra note 200, at 176
("recall that the framers' core checks and balances value was to ensure a balance of
power among the branches to prevent the tyranny of any one branch (and thus preserve
individual liberty) ... ").
301. See HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N, supra note 192, at 212.
302. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 83, at 557.
303. See id. at 557-59; see also Jacob J. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional
Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455,
462 (1977) (claiming legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet
devised" to control lawmaking).
304. See HARVARD L. REV. Ass'N, supra note 192, at 212-14.
305. See id. at 212, 214.
306. See id.
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Fisher argues, prohibition of the veto has created a "system of
lawmaking that is now more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than
before. 3 °7 Since Congress has turned to other statutory and nonstatutory
controls, the system is now less connected to the ideals of representative
government imbedded in the Constitution.30 8
Furthermore, critics contest the Court's position that the legislative
veto is per se unconstitutional.30 9 Some classify it as not falling into the
"legislative" category because it is simply an up or down vote, not
substantive law. 310  Another position analogizes the veto to mere
legislative override of a presidential veto.311 Although it does not answer
the question of constitutionality, should credence be given to the fact that
the veto only becomes law after it passes through both Houses and the
President signs?
C. Which System Is Preferable?
Answering the question of whether we have experienced a more or
less preferable system since Chadha is difficult for various reasons. A
glaring example is the fact that laws continue to include legislative
vetoes, despite the Court's clear pronouncements in Chadha and its
progeny. 312 Although the current system is not wholly without vetoes,
they are used only as threats to agencies rather than being openly
applied.313 The problem is further compounded by the difficulty in
monitoring or quantifying the effect of Congress's informal methods of
control. 314 Pre-Chadha use of the legislative veto could be more easily
tracked.315  In the post-Chadha framework, save the few examples
discussed above, 316 it is troublesome to analyze the specific impact of the
veto ban, in light of the more "underground ' 31 7 approach to control.
The marriage of the legislative veto to agency behavior is
unmistakable, but it is important to separate the two to properly
307. Fisher, supra note 7, at 292.
308. See generally id. (system more democratic with legislative veto).
309. See generally Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
225 (Spring 2007); HARVARD L. REv. ASS'N, supra note 192.
310. See HARVARD L. REV. ASS'N, supra note 192, at 215 (addressing argument that
veto is a backward way of legislating-legislature, not executive, holding veto power).
311. See id. at 215 & n.84 (no more objectionable than law passed by override).
312. See FISHER & DEVfNS, supra note 34, at 121; FISHER, supra note 5, at 102.
313. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 152 ("The legislative veto creates the most effective
kind of power, the kind that does not have to be used to be effective.").
314. See Greene, supra note 200, at 132 n.30 (citing studies showing difficulty in
calculating effect of congressional oversight).
315. See generally Fisher, supra note 7, at 288-89.
316. See supra Part III.B.1-3 (discussing NASA, AID, and Baker Accord).




determine the constitutional implications. In other words, it is best to
look at the legislative veto's constitutionality separate from Congress's
desire to check the powers delegated to agencies.
The give-and-take relationship between Congress and the agencies
to which it delegates authority is clearly not perfect. This is exemplified
in the weaknesses of both Burger's majority opinion and White's dissent.
I do agree with Burger's rationale that the Constitution's legislative
proscriptions should not be ignored.31 8 The Framers designed a process
between the legislative and executive branches to create law. 319  In
addition, simply because a legislative mechanism is "efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government," does not
mean that it is necessarily constitutional or that these advantages should
trump issues of constitutionality. 320  But, I also agree that Burger's
approach is inflexible, 321 undervalues the intricacies in the legislative
322 Afistprocess, and fails to pay sufficient homage to separation of powers
principles implied in the Constitution.323
Justice White, on the other hand, is persuasive in his description of
the use and necessity of the legislative veto. 324 It provided Congress with
a prime tool to control certain agency action in the expanded post-New
Deal administrative state.325 In addition, looking through a separation of
powers lens, it seems to embody a prominent view that the three
branches of government are not inseparable and must overlap in certain
areas. 326 Yet, the position fails to adequately address the letter of the
Constitution and the legislative procedures specifically proscribed.32 7
Therefore, the best approach might be to separate the two
overarching issues. One, is the legislative veto constitutional? The clear
answer is no. Despite Burger's rigid analysis, the legislative veto does
318. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983) (summarizing
holding of Court).
319. See id. at 947-51 (discussing Framers' views regarding presentment and
bicameralism).
320. See id. 462 U.S. at 944.
321. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 127 & n.9 (shock of Chadha was Court's inflexible
opinion).
322. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 292 (Court failed to understand the relationship
between executive and legislature and the intricacies of the legislative process in
Chadha).
323. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 978 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Framers' desire
to create system that would continue to grow and adapt to contemporary problems).
324. See id. at 974 (discussing Congress's use of veto as self-defense, not as a sword);
id. at 984-90 (highlighting the need for the veto in the modem administrative state).
325. See id. at 984-90.
326. See id. at 978 (discussing Framers' desire to create system that would continue to
grow and adapt to contemporary problems).
327. Justice White fails to adequately address legislative vetoes collision with Article
I's bicameralism and presentment requirements. See generally id. at 967-1003.
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not conform to Article I, Section 7. There is little or no sign of its
(constitutional) resurrection and the current Court's ideological make-
up-tending to favor a unitary executive-confirms this presumption.328
Two, does Congress have adequate ability to effectively control
agency behavior? Although a determination of adequacy is endlessly
debatable, and will likely be founded in one's ideological slant, Congress
has adapted. Justice White's dire predictions329 have not come true.
Congress has no doubt been faced with a challenging situation. It was
too late in the day for Congress to stop delegating to agencies, 330 but it
has had to do so without the strong arm of the veto provision. Congress
has responded by turning to its other statutory and nonstatutory controls
to help fill the void left by the veto's official ban.33'
Therefore, in answering this second question, Congress's best
policy is to be ingenious and entrepreneurial in its efforts to find new
controls. Although techniques such as budget controls and oversight
hearings tend to work in various settings, it will behoove Congress to
continually explore new methods.
As with any relationship, the push-and-pull between Congress and
agencies will vary. Political majorities, changes in administrations or the
judiciary, progressive legislation, and economic shifts are among the
various factors that are sure to influence each group's leverage in the
future. Assuming that legislative vetoes will not have the same impact in
the future as they have had in the past, interesting dilemmas could arise
when Congress tries to follow the rules. What happens if: Congress
passes legislation that affects an agency, which is in strict accordance
with the directives outlined by Justice Burger in Chadha, and the
President signs, but the agency is ordered to disobey? Congress, the
constitutional lawmaking body, speaks, follows constitutional
procedures, yet its will is stunned through a presidential signing
statement directing the agency to disobey.
V. Presidential Signing Statements' Impact and Congressional Control
of Agency Action
Presidential signing statements have been described as:
328. See Jeffrey Rosen, Bush's Leviathan State: Power of One, NEW REPUBLIC
ONLINE, July 18, 2006, http://www.tnr.com/doc.rnhtml?i=20060724&srosen72406
(author states Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and possibly Roberts, support unitary
executive theory).
329. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress's
"Hobson's choice").
330. For Congress to stop delegating authority to agencies would require a dramatic
reversion to the pre-New Deal time period-an occurrence which would be nearly
impossible in light of the modem administrative state. (Citation).
331. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 288-89.
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Official pronouncements issued by the President contemporaneously
to the signing of a bill into law that, in addition to commenting on the
law generally, have been used to forward the President's
interpretation of the statutory language; to assert constitutional
objections to the provisions contained therein; and, concordantly, to
announce that the provisions of the law will be administered in a
manner that comports with the Administration's conception of the
President's constitutional prerogatives.
332
Despite the recent debate surrounding the statements,333 there is nothing
per se unconstitutional about them.3 34 They have no basis in the
Constitution, but also have no actual legal effect.335 As one scholar
notes, historically, they have "promote[d] public awareness and
discourse in much the same way as a veto message" and served "a
largely innocuous and ceremonial function. 336  However, issues of
constitutionality and separation of powers arise when the statements are
"used not to extol the virtues of the bill being signed into law, but to
simultaneously condemn a provision of the new law as unconstitutional
and announce the President's refusal to enforce the unconstitutional
provision.
3 37
Signing statements have been used since the Presidency of James
Monroe, 338 but have been exercised in differing contexts. 339 Throughout
the 19th century, Presidents included them sparingly and usually avoided
condemning laws that they had signed.34 °  President Reagan's
administration is credited with starting the current signing statement
332. Halstead, supra note 9, at 1 (citing Philip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar
Allen Poe and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRES. STUD. Q.
515, 517 (Sept. 2005)).
333. See generally ABA, supra note 10, at 2-5 (discussing controversy surrounding
President George W. Bush's signing statements).
334. Halstead, supra note 9, at 1.
335. Id.
336. ABA, supra note 10, at 6 (quoting Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the
President's Authority to Refuse to Enforce the Law 2 (June 15, 2006), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/KinkopfSigning%20Statements%20and%20President's%20
Authority.pdf)).
337. Id. (quoting Christopher Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential
Signing Statement (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami Univ. (Ohio) (on file
with CONG. RESEARCH SERV.)), available at http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?
miami1057716977).
338. Halstead, supra note 9, at 2.
339. See ABA, supra note 10, at 7-14 (discussing Presidents' use of signing
statements-generally early used to explain or comment on legislation, while modem
Presidents have used them to question constitutionality of laws). For in-depth history of
presidential signing statements, see Halstead, supra note 9, at 1-3; Kelley, supra note
337.
340. See ABA, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that during 19th Century Presidents
generally "shyed" away from denouncing provisions they signed).
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trend.34' The administration took a proactive approach to assertive
executive power. 342 Reagan expanded the number of statements used
343
and sought to change the way courts considered them as legislative
history.34
Presidents Bush (I) and Clinton followed Reagan's lead.345 Bush (I)
issued a higher proportion of statements objecting to constitutionality
and also tried to impact their use as legislative history.346 Clinton used
the statements proportionately less to object on constitutionality
grounds347 but were still "an important cornerstone of [his] presidential
power .... 48
President Bush's (II) use of the signing statement has drawn the
most controversy. 349 Less than halfway through his second term, he had
challenged approximately 807 specific provisions.35° Commentators and
Senators alike have criticized the President's approach. 351
Bush's (II) treatment of the signing statement sparked a neutral task
force to evaluate the issue,352 and the Congressional Research Service
341. See id. at 10.
342. See Halstead, supra note 9, at 3.
343. See id. (citing Kelley, supra note 337, at 192, app. 3.1) (Reagan issued more
signing statements than any other President up to that time. Reagan issued 276 with 71
(26%) questioning constitutionality).
344. See id. at 3 & nn.13-14 (Report cites a memorandum drafted by Samuel A. Alito,
Jr., during tenure with Office of Legal Counsel at Department of Justice, stating it was
the "primary objective" to "ensure that Presidential signing statements assume their
rightful place in the interpretation of legislation." (citation omitted). In another
interesting tactic, Attorney General, Edwin Meese, III, contracted with West Publishing
Company to have signing statements included in the legislative histories in the United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.) issues).
345. See ABA, supra note 10, at 11-13 (both Presidents followed precedent set by
Reagan).
346. See Halstead, supra note 9, at 5 (citing Kelley, supra note 337, at 192, app. 3.1)
(Bush (I) issued 214 signing statements with 146 (68%) questioning constitutionality).
347. See id. at 6 (citing Kelley, supra note 337, at 192 app. 3.1) (Clinton issued 391
signing statements with 105 (27%) questioning constitutionality).
348. See ABA, supra note 10, at 13 (citing 1993 memorandum from Walter Dellinger
of the Office of Legal Counsel).
349. See generally id.
350. Id. at 14-15 & n.52 (citing Christopher S. Kelley, A Signing Statement Update,
MEDIA WATCH BLOG, July 11, 2006, http://www.users.muohio.edu/kelleycs/2006/07/
signing-statement-update.html (Bush's (II) challenges as of July 11, 2006)).
351. See id. at 2-4 (citing comments by: Charlie Savage, a Boston Globe reporter that
has written extensively in opposition; Senators Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Patrick Leahy's
(D-VT) disagreement with Bush's (II) use of signing statements); see also The Use of
Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id= 1969 (for statements of
all witnesses)).




also published a report353 shortly thereafter. Common themes between
the two reports reveal the most contentious issues are: the number of
signing statements issued (especially the number questioning the
constitutionality of provisions), the breadth of laws covered, and the use
in controversial legislation.354 Since he took office in 2000, President
Bush (II) has challenged the constitutionality of provisions in
approximately eighty-six percent of his signing statements.3 55  In an
effort to promote the theory of a unitary executive, 356 he has essentially
covered all levels and elements of the executive branch.357 Furthermore,
his choice of when to include the statements has prompted criticism.
358
Noteworthy examples include the law containing the McCain
Amendment prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners
359
and the renewal of the Patriot Act 360 .
President Bush's (II) signing statements are viewed as "an integral
part of the Administration's efforts to further its broad view of...
control over all elements of the executive decisionmaking process" and
have been widely interpreted as "aimed at altering the conception of
presidential authority not only in the internal operations of the Executive
Branch, but with respect to Congress, the courts and the public."
361
353. See Halstead, supra note 9.
354. See generally id.
355. See id. at 9.
356. See id. at 10 & n.44 (citing Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony
J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601
(2005)). In a general sense, the unitary executive theory encompasses the opinion that
"the President alone has the power to control execution of all federal laws." William
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and
the Case ofAmar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487, 530 (2007) (citations omitted).
357. See Halstead, supra note 9, at 8.358.See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges
Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al (construing statement as
providing President an outlet to ignore the anti-torture measures should it be required to
prevent terrorist attacks and construing statement as providing President authority to
ignore reporting requirements for secret searches and seizures).
359. Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2863, Department
of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf
of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. S50. See Savage, supra note 358 and accompanying text.
360. Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3199, U.S.A. Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006). See Savage, supra note 358 and accompanying text.
361. Halstead, supra note 9, at 11.
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A. What Does this Mean for Our System of Governance?
If Chadha remains good law, the only logical conclusion, in this
context, is to limit the weight of presidential signing statements. If the
legislative veto is not a constitutional variation of the congressional
override, the quasi-veto signing statement must not be a constitutional
variation of the presidential veto. The sheer volume and breadth of laws
covered by President Bush (II) sounds alarms.3 62 Where is this trend
taking us?
In Chadha, the Court was clear about its stance: "the legislative
power of the Federal Government [shall] be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure. 363 The
Court announced that Congress is the legislative body and must follow
Article I, Section 7 procedures. 364  Of course, part of this process
involves the President. 365 A bill cannot become law unless the President
signs it, Congress overrides a veto, or the President fails to sign within
the required time period. 366 It is clear from the Framers' -intent, as well
as constitutional interpretation throughout history, the President's role is
not lawmaker. 367 The Court has affirmed this position in rejecting the
presidential line-item veto which allowed a President to veto portions of
a bill and accept others. 368 The line-item veto fostered after-the-fact
legislating by the President. 369  The power enabled the President to
substantially change the law by cutting portions of a congressionally
enacted bill and thus changing the intent of the lawmaking body. 370 As
the Court in Clinton highlighted, the Constitution specially proscribes the
procedure for presidential approval; the President must accept as whole,
or reject in toto.
3 7 1
So how are signing statements much different? They also serve as
after-the-fact presidential tinkering with congressionally passed bills.
372
Yet, supporters point out their nonbinding legal effect.373 This argument,
like Burger's opinion in Chadha, is factually accurate, but it fails to
understand the informal intricacies and power-plays in our constitutional
362. See generally id.; ABA, supra note 10.
363. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
364. Id. at 951-52.
365. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. I § 7.
366. See id. art. I, § 7.
367. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
368. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
369. See id. at 436-41.
370. See id.
371. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-41 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2).
372. See ABA, supra note 10, at 6, 18-25.
373. See Halstead, supra note 9, at 14.
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system. In light of the discussion on informal or nonstatutory controls,
374
it is easy to understand why signing statements, objecting to the
constitutionality of provisions, are problematic. The signing statement
does not carry the force of law, but it could have the same practical effect
by compelling an agency to act in a way that undermines the system of
checks and balances and separation of powers.
It is not difficult to imagine the following hypothetical situation.
Congress prepares legislation containing provisions that appropriate
funds to executive agency A. The bill provides provisions designating
where the funds should be applied (e.g., fifty million dollars for stem-cell
research and thirty million dollars for alternative forms of Alzheimer's
research). The bill is presented to the President and the President signs.
In addition to the signature, the President includes a signing statement
that directs A to disregard Congress's fifty million dollar stem-cell
research directive because it is, in the President's view, unconstitutional
and in conflict with the unitary executive theory held by the
administration.
What is agency A to do? Of course A could disregard the
President's statement and follow Congress's directive. But, other
influences are sure to impact A's decision.375 The President serves as A's
"boss." The agency head knows that direct conflict with the President
could result in the loss of the agency head's job because that person
serves at the will of the President.376 Also, agency A will want to avoid
reorganization, restructuring, or any other diminution in its power by the
executive.37 7
On the flipside, what if A wants to strengthen its relationship with
the President? The agency could take the opportunity to ignore the
statute and follow the President's demands to demonstrate its loyalty or
"team-player" attitude.
Regardless of the agency's choice, it is put in a difficult position. If
it follows the President, it is disobeying the law. If it follows Congress
and the law, it might face immediate political repercussions.
Furthermore, if supporters truly believe that the statements do not
carry legal effect, why issue them at all? Presidents of course are free to
comment on legislation, but why call into question a provision's
constitutionality after the bill has been signed? As Chadha and Clinton
instruct, Presidents should conform to constitutionally proscribed
procedures and not overstep their role in the lawmaking process.378 They
374. See supra Part III (discussing Congress's mechanisms to control agency action).
375. See id.
376. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II.
377. See generally supra Part III.
378. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945, 956-58 (1983); Clinton v. New York, 524
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should take the opportunity, through communications with Congress or
in a veto message, to voice their disagreement with the law. After-the-
fact directives reduce the legitimacy of the law rather than bolstering its
credibility.37 9
The deleterious effects on the systems of separation of powers and
checks and balances are significant.38° Signing statements essentially
muddy the waters of the judicial review process. 38' How does the Court
deal with an action that does not follow the rule of law and instead
provokes another entity, an agency, to disobey the law? The statements
also raise questions of justiciability. 382 How will the Court struggle with
issues of standing, ripeness, and mootness in this arena? Will the Court
determine signing statements are justiciable?
Furthermore, this battle will only reduce judicial capital.383 Should
the issue reach court, the court would likely review the agency action in
question, against the statute, rather than the signing statement. 384 Judicial
treatment of agency action generally garners a great deal of favorable
deference.385
The statements also reduce judicial capital in a more significant way
by allowing Presidents to interpret the Constitution.386 By interpreting
law as in conflict with the Constitution through a signing statement, with
the expectation that others will follow the statement, Presidents seem to
circumvent the judicial branch's power to interpret.387
The statements work an even more negative effect on Congress's
power, weakening its role as lawmaker. Essentially Congress follows the
letter of the Constitution and passes a law in strict accordance, only to
have the President accept, but reduce it to the President's specifications,
after it has been passed. This forces Congress into a complicated
situation. Congresspersons could file suit, a most undesirable option.
Lawsuits would bring recurring issues of standing, cost, efficiency, and
timeliness of corrective action. It could rely on its informal controls of
agency action.388 But, Congress is not always going to be victorious in
the struggle for control over an agency that is caught between the grips
U.S. 417, 436-41 (1998).
379. See generally ABA, supra note 10.
380. See generally id.
381. Seeid. at 25-26.
382. See id.
383. See generally Halstead, supra note 9.
384. See id. at 22-23.
385. I am alluding to judicial review in the wake of Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and its progeny.
386. See ABA, supra note 10, at 23.
387. See id. ("Definitive constitutional interpretations are entrusted to an independent
and impartial Supreme Court... [t]hat is the meaning of Marbury v. Madison.").
388. See infra Part III.D.2.
[Vol. 112:41162
CONGRESSIONAL CREATIVITY
of the administration and statutory mandate. Further, although
nonstatutory controls can be effective, "unless Congress is to be rendered
a think tank or debating society, they are no substitute for the exercise of
actual authority. ' '389  This is especially true when Congress has
successfully expressed its intent through Article I, Section 7 procedures.
As the lawmaking body, Congress is expected to solve problems
and express its will through legislation. In this situation, should
Congress try to correct agency nonconformity, it could easily be faced
with another disapproving signing statement. It is easy to imagine
Congress passing a law (to counter a past law that was curbed by a
signing statement), only to have the President again limit its scope with
another statement. Although this hypothetical is unlikely to be a frequent
occurrence, it serves to illustrate the grave potential for harm should
limits not be imposed.
B. What is Congress to Do?
In light of Chadha's ban on legislative vetoes and the explosion of
presidential signing statements under President Bush (II), Congress faces
greater disadvantages in efforts to control administrative agencies. 390 It
is challenged with reviewing agency action, often voluminous and highly
technical, without an efficient legislative veto. This is compounded by
the fact that if Congress does pass a law through the constitutionally
proscribed process, it may face a signing statement altering its original
intent.
In light of the constitutional structure of separation of powers and
checks and balances, solutions to this issue are challenging. The fact that
signing statements do not officially carry the weight of the law creates
justiciability problems for legal redress in the courts.3 9' Passing
legislation through both Houses of Congress, often both strongly partisan
bodies, can be laborious and time consuming.
The best method is a proactive approach by Congress to counteract
the widespread use of presidential signing statements. The ABA's
recommendation that Congress should enact legislation making it easier
for entities to seek judicial review of the statements should be heeded.392
By bringing the issue to the courts, and the public, Congress could find
favor in limiting the statements. Although it might be difficult to gain a
389. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 973 & n.10 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
390. See generally ABA, supra note 10.
Halstead, supra note 9.
391. See id. at 25-26.
392. See id. at 5 (as part of study, ABA Task Force unanimously issued specific
recommendations).
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President's signature, Congress could turn to its statutory override
power.
393
Another strategy should focus on nonstatutory mechanisms, like
those used in the wake of Chadha.394 Congress can use its power of the
purse or other legislative tools as threats to the executive. 395 Rather than
trying to pass a law, Congress could stall appointments, threaten
reductions in funding, delay the administration's own legislative agenda,
or any other action that proves effective.
If the trend towards using presidential signing statements continues
to grow in volume or in specificity of the messages, Congress will likely
need to find an effective solution. Whether it turns to legislation, the
courts, or other informal means, Congress must seek to preserve its
legislative power-at least what power it has left.
VI. Conclusion
For a rather short period of time, the legislative veto became an
effective tool in the congressional toolbox. Stretching from the 1930s
through the early 1980s, it enabled one or both Houses of Congress to
check agency action without conforming to Article I, Section 7
procedures.396 In Chadha, the Court swiftly banned use of the veto in all
contexts.39 7 Despite Congress's overall disdain for the reduction in
power, it reacted with an internal compromise. Congress began to rely
on the use of other statutory and nonstatutory controls to influence
agency behavior, and on the other hand, in some contexts it has been
successful in continuing to enact the vetoes.
Despite the other controls, the legislative veto was a more effective
congressional weapon. Although more effective in application, it fails to
adequately conform to our constitutional framework and democratic
system of government. The Framers' bicameralism and presentment
directives clearly speak to the procedure they had in mind.
The debate surrounding the legislative veto has calmed with the
consensus agreeing that it is unconstitutional. But, the new debate
centers on what happens when Congress does follow legislative
requirements but a presidential signing statement trumps its efforts. The
issues surrounding signing statements have brought heightened
controversy of late. The contentious argument over whether a President
is constitutionally permitted to modify legislation, after it meets
393. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
394. See supra Part III.
395. See id.
396. See generally Fisher, supra note 7.
397. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-39 (1983).
1164 [Vol. 112:4
2008] CONGRESSIONAL CREATIVITY 1165
congressional approval, will likely see development in the near future.
Should the current President, and his successors, curtail the use of the
signing statement, congressional response will likely follow suit. On the
other hand, should the current trend continue, or increase, I predict a
more aggressive congressional approach limiting the statements'
applicability-or at least welcome it.

